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Tuorto: You Blew It

YOU BLEW IT: THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE &
BREATHALYZERS AS TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Umpierre1
(decided September 21, 2012)

I.

INTRODUCTION

Following the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts2 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,3
with respect to scientific testing, courts have maintained varying
views of what constitutes testimonial evidence,4 especially in New
York.5 The first issue presented to the court in Umpierre was wheth1

951 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012).
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
3
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
4
Compare Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 947 N.E.2d 1060, 1062 (Mass. 2011), and State
v. Benson, 287 P.3d 927, 928 (Kan. 2012) (holding that the Breathalyzer certifications were
non-testimonial and were admissible absent live in-court testimony), with Derr v. State, 29
A.3d 533, 554 (Md. 2008), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 63 (relying on Bullcoming, holding that
calibration reports are testimonial in nature because they “present[] a risk of error that might
be explored on cross-examination”), and Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that Breathalyzer calibration reports are testimonial, even under Crawford standards, because an objective witness could reasonably expect that they would be
used at a criminal prosecution).
5
Compare People v. Hulbert, 939 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012), People
v. Harvey, 907 N.Y.S.2d 102, 102 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding that the calibration reports and
the simulator solution reports, ensuring the reliability of the Breathalyzer instrument, are not
testimonial because they do not link the defendant to the crime), and People v. Lebrecht, 823
N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (App. Term 2006) (holding that the breath test certification reports were
non-testimonial because they were neutral in character, relating only to the operation of the
instrument and the simulator solution used to calibrate it, and the reports did not result from
“structured police questioning,” were not created as an official request to gain incriminating
evidence, and did not accuse anyone of criminal conduct), with People v. Heyanka, 886
N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Dist. Ct. 2009) (holding that the calibration reports were testimonial because they were prepared with a “reasonable expectation that they would be used at criminal
2
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er Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results qualified as testimonial
evidence, requiring live in-court testimony.6 After determining that
the Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results were testimonial, the
court then had to determine who could testify in order to withstand a
Confrontation Clause challenge.7 Relying on federal precedent, the
court in Umpierre correctly held that the admission of the test results,
without live in-court testimony from the officer who performed the
Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000, violated Umpierre’s rights under
the Confrontation Clause.8
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 14, 2010, Jose Umpierre was erratically changing lanes when two New York Police Department (“NYPD”) Officers, Stephen Rizzo and Daniel Glatz, pulled him over.9 Officer Rizzo
observed that Umpierre appeared intoxicated, and consequently gave
Umpierre a Breathalyzer.10 While Officer Rizzo administered the
Breathalyzer, Officer Glatz stood several feet away and did not hear
any words exchanged.11 Upon failing the Breathalyzer, Officer Rizzo
arrested Umpierre and charged him with various alcohol-related traffic offenses.12 After bringing Umpierre to the 45th precinct, Officer
Rizzo administered a follow-up Intoxilyzer 5000, which the defendant also failed.13
In anticipation of trial, the prosecution sought to introduce

prosecutions.”), and People v. Carriera, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (Crim. Ct. 2010) (holding
that the breath test calibration and simulator solution tests were testimonial because they
were created by law enforcement officials for use at trial).
6
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 386.
9
Id. at 383.
10
Id.
11
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 384 (noting that Officer Glatz operated a video camera during the testing but could not hear the words exchanged—why the prosecution did not admit
the video into evidence is beyond the scope of this case note).
12
Id. at 383. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney 2012) (driving while
impaired statute); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 2012) (driving while ability impaired statute); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2)(a) (providing the aggravated driving while intoxicated statute); VEH. & TRAF. Law § 1192(3) (driving while intoxicated statute); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1)(b) (McKinney 2010) (administering field sobriety
tests to establish the suspect’s blood-alcohol level at the scene standard).
13
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383; N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(a).
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both the Breathalyzer and the Intoxilyzer 5000 test results.14
Umpierre moved to exclude this evidence, arguing that because Officer Rizzo was unavailable he would not be able to cross-examine
him about the test results; thus, his right to confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment would be violated.15 Relying on the precedent set
forth in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the court determined that the
test results were testimonial and could only be introduced through
live in-court testimony of the officer who conducted the tests—
Officer Rizzo.16 The court explained that because Officer Glatz was
merely a test observer and he was not within hearing distance while
the tests were conducted, he could not testify on behalf of Officer
Rizzo.17 Thus, the court granted the defendant’s motion.18
III.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause has continuously evolved.19
The Sixth
Amendment guarantees “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”20 Although the language of the Sixth Amendment appears
straight-forward, “the exact contours of th[is] right in the context of
scientific testing is a source of significant litigation.”21 The Court
built upon its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v.

14

Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
Id. at 384.
16
Id. at 386.
17
Id. at 384.
18
Id. at 386.
19
Megan Weisgerber, Confronting Forensics: Bullcoming v. New Mexico and the Sixth
Amendment, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 613, 614 (2012); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by, Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305;
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S Ct. 1143 (2011); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705; Williams v. Illinois, 132 U.S. 2221, 2227 (2012).
20
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (making the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause applicable to state criminal prosecutions through
incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
21
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 385; Michael J. Hutter, ‘Pealer’ and Forensic-Related Records: Confronting ‘Crawford’ and its progeny, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 4, 2013) (stating that because
of the categories created in Crawford, “[m]uch litigation has ensued over the boundaries of
these categories, especially as to the classification of forensic reports . . . and the records of
the maintenance/calibration/inspection efforts employed to ensure that the devices or machines utilized in those analyses and tests are working properly.”).
15

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 17

1178

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Washington22 when it overruled Ohio v. Roberts23 and shifted its inquiry from whether the evidence is reliable to whether the evidence is
“testimonial.”24 In recent years, the Court has clarified what constitutes testimonial evidence and what is required to pass constitutional
muster.25
In Crawford the Supreme Court established a new test to determine whether the evidence is testimonial in nature.26 In Crawford,
the defendant was charged with assault and attempted murder after he
stabbed the victim.27 Although the defendant claimed that he had
stabbed the victim in self-defense, his wife gave a tape-recorded
statement to the police undermining his self-defense claim.28 At trial,
the prosecution sought to play the recording because, under the state
marital privilege statute, the prosecution was unable to call the defendant’s wife as a witness.29 The defendant moved to suppress the
recording, claiming that it violated his Sixth Amendment right because he could not cross-examine his wife.30 The trial court, relying
22

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Court held that out-of-court statements by witnesses who are
unable to testify can be admitted into evidence if the court determines that the evidence falls
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”. Id. at 66. See Harlan Spector, Legal Challenges Mount Against Controversial
Breath-Alcohol
Tester,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Jan.
13,
2012,
12:01
AM),
http://www.cleveland.co
m/metro/index.ssf/2013/01/legal_challenges_mount_against.htm l?utm_medium=referral&ut
m_source=t.co (stating that the sole purpose for the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the
reliability of the statement).
24
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 n.6 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (determining that a
statement is testimonial when it has a “primary purpose of establishing or proving past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25
See Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that the Supreme Court
was sharply divided when it extended the ruling in Crawford to Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming).
26
541 U.S. at 51-52; see also United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
2011) (noting that the Court in Crawford affected a shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
27
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38, 40.
28
Id. at 40 (noting that the defendant had stabbed the victim because the victim had allegedly tried to rape the defendant’s wife).
29
Id. The defendant’s wife was unavailable and was not subject to cross examination at
trial because of the Washington State marital privilege statute, which generally bars a spouse
from testifying against the other spouse without the defendant-spouse’s consent. Id. Under
this statute, the privilege does not protect out-of-court statements made by the spouse, which
are admissible as a hearsay exception. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 5.60.060(1)
(LexisNexis 1994).
30
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
23
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on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts, allowed the prosecution
to play the recording for the jury, which ultimately resulted in a
guilty verdict for the defendant.31 On appeal, the Washington Court
of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction.32 However, the
Washington Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s conviction,
unanimously holding that the recording bore “guarantees of trustworthiness” because it was virtually identical to the defendant’s confession.33
On review, the United States Supreme Court in Crawford
overruled Roberts, holding that the decision was inconsistent with the
Framers’ intentions.34 The decision in Crawford repudiated the
Court’s prior Confrontation Clause jurisprudence by shifting the inquiry from whether the evidence had “indicia of reliability” to whether the evidence was testimonial.35 If a statement is deemed testimonial, its introduction into evidence will violate the Sixth Amendment
unless the prosecution produces the declarant as a witness or shows
that the declarant is unavailable and that the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.36 The Court established three categories of out-of-court statements that qualify as testimonial:
[(1)] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially; [(2)] extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
31

Id. at 40-41.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41. The court used a nine-factor test and determined the recording was not reliable because the witness stated that her eyes were shut during the stabbing,
she contradicted a prior statement, and her answers were in response to specific questions
asked by the police. Id.
33
Id. The Confrontation Clause is implicated anytime a witness offers testimony against
the defendant. Id. at 51.
34
Id. at 62-63, 65-66 (stating that the reliability test strays from the original meaning of
the Confrontation Clause and emphasizing that the right to confront one’s accusers dates
back to Roman times).
35
Id. at 51 (defining testimony as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” and that assessing the reliability of testimony is
amorphous and subjective).
36
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 (emphasizing that the Framers would not have condoned
ex parte examinations involving law enforcement because of the focused language of the
Confrontation Clause).
32
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affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;
and [(3)] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.37
Under the first category, the Court held that because the prosecution
introduced the recording into evidence and gave no opportunity for
cross-examination, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right had been
violated.38 Despite establishing the three categories, the Court declined to clearly explain under what circumstances the admission of
each type of evidence implicates the right to confrontation, leaving
the issue “for another day.”39
That day arose when the Supreme Court decided MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts.40 In Melendez-Diaz, Boston Police Officers
received a tip from an informant that an employee of a local store
was involved in suspicious activity.41 The police set up surveillance
outside of the store and witnessed the employee get into a car with
two men—activity resembling a drug deal.42 After the employee exited the vehicle, one of the officers detained and searched him, finding a plastic bag containing what appeared to be cocaine.43 The officers arrested all three men, including the defendant and placed them
in the back of their police vehicle.44 At the police station, the officers
found nineteen small plastic bags in the police vehicle where the defendant had been sitting.45 The police sent the bags to the lab for testing, which revealed that they all contained cocaine.46
At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce the criminal forensic laboratory certificates into evidence, which certified that the

37

Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 68.
39
Id.; see Nardi, 662 F.3d at 111 (noting that although the majority opinion in Crawford
commanded seven Justices and the remaining two Justices concurred with that result, the
decision was misleading because the Court declined to determine how far the testimonial
statement reached, suggesting a narrow interpretation of what constitutes testimonial evidence).
40
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 308.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308.
46
Id.
38
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drug in the defendant’s possession was cocaine.47 The defendant objected to the admission of these affidavits, arguing that his inability to
cross-examine the analyst who conducted the tests violated the Confrontation Clause.48 The trial court overruled the defendant’s objection; the defendant was convicted and subsequently appealed.49 The
Appeals Court of Massachusetts rejected the defendant’s claim, relying on state precedent that “authors of certificates of forensic analysis
are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”50
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, expanded the scope of testimonial evidence to include a
consideration of whether the evidence was obtained strictly for use at
trial.51 The Court, relying on its decision in Palmer v. Hoffman,52
stated that documents containing hearsay, which can ordinarily be
admitted under the business record exception, cannot be admitted if
the regularly conducted business activity is “the production of evidence for use at trial.”53 Affidavits, like the ones at issue, had already
been analyzed in Davis v. Washington,54 and the Court noted that “
‘certificates’ [that] are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, do[] ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ ”55
The Court concluded that, absent the testimony of the person who
performed the underlying tests, the criminal forensic laboratory reports were testimonial, and thus, inadmissible.56 The Court reasoned
that the reports were not exempt from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
because they were “quite plainly affidavits” falling within the “core

47

Id.
Id. at 309.
49
Id. (holding that the certificates were admitted pursuant to Massachusetts law as “prima
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the narcotic . . . analyzed”)
(quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13 (repealed 2012) (alteration in original)).
50
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309; Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705-06
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that the drug certificates at issue were admissible as business
records and did not constitute testimonial evidence because they have very little connection
to the type of evidence the Confrontation Clause was designed to exclude).
51
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309, 321.
52
318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943).
53
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321; FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
54
Davis, 547 U.S. at 836-37.
55
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 83, that the affidavits
are testimonial under Crawford because an objective witness could reasonably believe that
they would be used for trial and that the sole purpose was to make a prima facie prosecution).
56
Id. at 324.
48
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class of testimonial statements” set forth in Crawford.57 The Court
emphasized that confrontation ensures accurate forensic analysis and
is “designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.”58 The Court observed that an analyst’s lack
of proper training or deficiency in a judgment may be discovered during cross-examination.59
Subsequently, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,60 a five-Justice
majority reaffirmed Melendez-Diaz and clarified that a substitute analyst could not testify on behalf of the person who performed the certifications in order to withstand Confrontation Clause scrutiny.61 In
Bullcoming, the defendant rear-ended a pick-up truck, and as the
driver of the pick-up truck approached the defendant to exchange information, he smelled alcohol and noticed that the defendant’s eyes
were bloodshot.62 The defendant fled the scene and was later apprehended by police, who administered field sobriety tests.63 Upon failing the tests, the police arrested the defendant. 64 Because the defendant refused to take another sobriety test, the police obtained a warrant
authorizing such a test at a nearby hospital.65 After the sample was
taken, the police sent it to the New Mexico Department of Health,
Scientific Laboratory Division (“SLD”).66 The SLD’s report contained information supplied by the arresting officer, including that he
witnessed the blood being drawn.67 The report also contained certifications by the nurse who drew the sample and the SLD analyst’s cer57

Id. at 310 (relying on Crawford to find that the defendant was entitled to confront the
analysts at trial).
58
Id. at 312, 319 (emphasizing that the majority was not, as the dissent warned, “sweeping away an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence,” and that all of the
cases it cited relied on the “since-rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was admissible
as long as it bore indicia of reliability.”).
59
Id. at 317-20 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62, that “[the Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”).
60
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
61
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713; compare Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306, (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
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tifications, stating that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was well
above the legal limit.68
At trial, the prosecutor announced that another SLD analyst
would be called as a witness because the SLD analyst who performed
the certification had gone on unpaid leave.69 The defendant objected
to this analyst’s testimony, arguing that it violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause.70 The trial court overruled the defendant’s objection and admitted the SLD report into evidence as a business record.71 The jury convicted the defendant of aggravated driving while
intoxicated (“DWI”).72 On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction and concluded that the report
was non-testimonial and was “prepared routinely with guarantees of
trustworthiness.”73 While the defendant’s appeal to the New Mexico
Supreme Court was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz.74 In light of the Court’s decision in MelendezDiaz, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the admission of the
report did not violate the Confrontation Clause despite acknowledging that the report was testimonial.75
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bullcoming to address whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report through live in-court testimony of
an analyst who did not perform the underlying test.76 The Court reasoned that because the SLD analyst’s testimony not only indicated
the results of the analysis, but also the procedures involved, a substitute analyst would not be able to testify to any potential errors during
that process.77 This type of evidence, the Court stated, was testimonial if it was “made in aid of a police investigation” or if it was used
in order to establish a fact at trial.78 The Court held that the prosecutor could not introduce the written analysis of individuals who neither
68

Id.
Id. at 2711-12.
70
Id. at 2712.
71
Id.
72
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 2712-13 (emphasizing that the substitute analyst was a qualified expert with respect to the machine).
76
Id.
77
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711.
78
Id. at 2717.
69
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participated in nor observed the testing of the blood sample.79 The
Court emphasized that the accused have a right to confront the analyst who made the report and that an additional scientific report could
not be introduced unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the analyst who prepared it.80
IV.

THE NEW YORK INTERPRETATION OF TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE

Prior to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the New York Court
of Appeals had decided People v. Rawlins81 and People v. Meekins.82
The Court of Appeals decided both Rawlins and Meekins on the same
day and relied upon the precedent set by Crawford to assess whether
DNA and latent fingerprint comparison reports were testimonial in
nature, and thus, whether their admission, absent the experts’ testimony, violated each respective defendant’s Confrontation Clause
rights.83 The Court of Appeals explored the first category of “ex
parte in-court testimony,” established by the Court in Crawford, to
justify its holding.84
The Court of Appeals held that latent fingerprint comparison
reports, prepared by law enforcement in Rawlins, were “nothing but
testimonial” because they were prepared by police for the use at trial;
however, because of the overwhelming evidence, the admission of
the reports was deemed harmless error.85 In the companion case,
Meekins, the court deemed a rape-kit DNA analysis, prepared by an
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) employee, nontestimonial because it was the product of a neutral scientific analysis.86 Thus, the court held that the reports were admissible and did
not offend the Confrontation Clause because they were not the type
of “ex parte testimony that the Confrontation Clause was designed to
79

Id. at 2710.
Id. (holding that a “surrogate analyst,” or any person who works for the laboratory, is
not a sufficient witness and will not escape the Confrontation Clause violation).
81
884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008) (noting that, at that time, this was an issue of first impression for the New York Court of Appeals).
82
884 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that a rape-kit DNA report, prepared by the
OCME, was non-testimonial because it was the product of a scientific analysis and did not
indicate the defendant’s innocence or guilt).
83
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1022.
84
Id. at 1026.
85
Id. at 1033-34.
86
Id. at 1035.
80
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protect against.”87 The court determined that the DNA reports fell
outside of the scope of the first category because the reports were neither made “with an eye toward trial,” nor prepared as “formal statement[s] to government officers.”88
However, in 2009, after the Supreme Court, in MelendezDiaz, clarified that Crawford’s categories of testimonial evidence extended to scientific testing, the New York Court of Appeals decided
People v. Brown89 and disregarded the Court’s decision by following
and expanding upon its own decision in Rawlins and Meekins.90 And
yet, even after the Supreme Court expanded its Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence in Bullcoming, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Pealer91 analyzed the issue by relying on Rawlins, Meekins,
and Brown instead of the federal precedent.92 Because of the conflicting interpretations of Confrontation Clause precedent by the
Court of Appeals, many lower New York courts continue to struggle
when determining what type of evidence triggers the Confrontation
Clause.93
In Brown, the defendant raped a nine-year old girl and hit her
with a brick after she resisted his sexual advances.94 Upon awaking,
the victim ran to her friend who brought her to the hospital where a
rape kit was performed.95 Due to a substantial backlog and lack of
funding, the OCME sent the rape kit—almost nine years after the
crime—to one of its subcontracting laboratories for testing.96 While
87
Id. (noting that although the Court in Crawford declined to give a “precise definition”
of testimonial, the Court categorically gave “additional clues,” which are generally described
on the whole as “ex parte accusatory” testimony).
88
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1026 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, that the involvement
of government law enforcement officials in gathering ex parte accusatory testimony or
statements presents a “unique potential for prosecutorial abuse”).
89
918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009).
90
See Hutter, supra note 27 (stating that the New York Court of Appeals provided the
framework, which the Supreme Court lacked, which is necessary in determining whether
evidence is testimonial).
91
985 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 2013).
92
Id. at 903.
93
See, e.g., People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that an autopsy report could be admitted as a business record, not requiring live in-court testimony because an
autopsy report is non-testimonial); People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
2011) (holding that an un-redacted autopsy report could be admitted into evidence without
testimony from the person who prepared it because it was not testimonial).
94
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 928.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 928-29.
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examining the perpetrator’s semen from the rape kit, the laboratory
technician isolated a male DNA specimen from a string of thirteen
areas.97 The technician entered this information into the Combined
DNA Index System, and three years later, “a routine search of the database registered a ‘cold hit,’ linking [the] defendant’s DNA to the
profile found in the victim’s rape kit.”98 Subsequently, the Queens
Special Victims Squad took a DNA sample from the defendant and
delivered it to the OCME, who then compared the defendant’s DNA
to the DNA from the rape kit.99 The OCME analyst determined that
the two profiles matched, occurring in “one out of one trillion
males.”100
At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce the DNA report,
including a profile of the specimen taken from the rape kit as a business record.101 Despite the defendant’s objections, the trial court held
that the DNA evidence was admissible because it was nontestimonial.102 The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of
sodomy, two counts of assault, and endangering the welfare of a
child; the Appellate Division Second Department affirmed the conviction.103 On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the court
differentiated DNA results from other laboratory results by stating
that “DNA test results, standing alone, shed no light on the guilt of
the accused in the absence of an expert’s opinion that the results genetically match a known sample.”104 The Court distinguished Melendez-Diaz from Brown, observing that in Brown, the OCME analyst
testified and came to her own conclusions based on the report provided by the subcontracting laboratory, whereas in Melendez-Diaz, the
affidavits concluded that the defendant possessed cocaine.105 The
court relied on the primary purpose test, enunciated in People v.
Freycinet,106 to clarify whether the report about which the OCME an97
Id. at 929 (noting that the lab technician also created a report which contained “machine-generated raw data, graphs and charts of the male specimen’s DNA characteristics.”).
98
Id.
99
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 929.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 929-30.
103
Id. at 930.
104
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930-31.
105
Compare id. at 931 (noting that the OCME analyst took the stand), with MelendezDiaz, 557 U.S. at 308-09 (noting that the prosecution sought to introduce the certificates
without in-court testimony).
106
892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008).
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alyst testified was the functional equivalent of live in-court testimony, and thus, testimonial under Crawford. The standard created by
the court asked:
(1) whether the agency that produced the record is independent of law enforcement; (2) whether it reflects
objective facts at the time of their recording; (3)
whether the report has been biased in favor of law enforcement; and (4) whether the report accuses the defendant by directly linking him or her to the crime.107
After considering all four categories, the court held that the reports
were non-testimonial.108 The court determined that the subcontracting laboratory was private and independent of law enforcement and
that there was no subjective analysis because the report did not contain any conclusions regarding the suspect’s identity.109 The court
emphasized that the technician prepared the report prior to the defendant becoming a suspect and that the testimony of the OCME analyst, not the report, linked the defendant to the crime.110 Thus, the
court reasoned that, unlike the defendant in Melendez-Diaz, the defendant in Brown had the ability to cross-examine the witness who
linked him to the crime.111
In People v. Thompson,112 law enforcement officials took
blood samples from two burglary crime scenes.113 The samples were
sent to two private laboratories and technicians created reports containing DNA profiles developed from the samples.114 At trial, the
prosecution sought to introduce the reports without providing testimony from the technician who prepared them.115 The defendant objected, arguing that this would violate his Sixth Amendment right.116
The court held that the reports were not testimonial, and the jury ultimately found the defendant guilty.117 The defendant appealed, and
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931.
Id. at 932; see also Pealer, 985 N.E.2d at 904.
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 931.
895 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010).
Id. at 148-49.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
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the Second Department affirmed, relying on Brown, stating that because the reports were “merely machine-generated graphs,” they
would not require further explanation.118 The Second Department
observed that the analysts would only be able to testify as to how
they performed certain tests because their analysis did not link the defendant to any crime nor did it contain any subjective conclusions or
comparisons of the samples taken from the defendant and from the
crime scene.119
Subsequently, in People v. Encarnacion,120 upon responding
to a 911 call at a Bronx apartment building, the defendant told the police that while he was out getting food “some black guy” stabbed his
girlfriend and her cousin.121 The police subsequently entered the
apartment and found the defendant’s girlfriend, with multiple stab
wounds, alongside her cousin who was dead.122 At the scene, police
found a garbage bag full of different items including clothing and
bloody knives.123 After the defendant’s girlfriend was transported to
the hospital, she told doctors that the defendant had stabbed her.124
The police interviewed the defendant, and after telling him that his
girlfriend was alive and had identified him as her attacker, he confessed.125
At trial, the prosecution called the forensic analyst from the
OCME, who performed the DNA testing on all of the clothing except
for a pair of jeans, sneakers, and socks.126 The analyst testified about
the tests that she performed—but also about the tests that she did not
perform—which linked the defendant to the crime.127 The defendant
objected, arguing that the analyst’s testimony, linking his DNA to the
DNA found on all of the clothes, violated his right to confrontation.128 The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument, and the jury subsequently convicted him on all counts.129
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 149.
Id.
926 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div 1st Dep’t 2011).
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 450-51.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 451 (noting that the defendant was convicted of second degree murder, attempted

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/17

14

Tuorto: You Blew It

2014]

YOU BLEW IT

1189

On appeal, the First Department upheld the defendant’s conviction, stating that a DNA analyst can testify regarding the analysis
of a test she did not perform because those tests revealed nonaccusatory raw data.130 The court relied on the decision in Brown and
deemed the analyst’s testimony, and all corresponding notes and reports, to be non-testimonial.131 Ironically, the same day that the First
Department decided Encarnacion, the Supreme Court decided
Bullcoming, which took the opposite view.132
Despite the trend in New York, the Second Department came
to a different conclusion in People v. Oliver133 and followed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of testimonial evidence in MelendezDiaz and Bullcoming.134 In Oliver, the police found blood at the scene of a burglary and sent it to the Suffolk County Crime Laboratory
for testing.135 The forensic scientist tested the DNA and uploaded it
onto the database; two weeks later, he discovered that a crime laboratory in Albany matched the DNA profile to the defendant’s.136 At trial, evidence of the DNA match was admitted, and the jury subsequently convicted the defendant of burglary in the second degree.137
Surprisingly, the Second Department, on appeal, reversed the
defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial.138 The Second Department held that the DNA profile match was testimonial in nature
second degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, and he was sentenced to twenty
years to life for the murder which would run consecutively with three twenty year prison
terms for the other charges).
130
Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
131
Id.
132
Compare id. (holding that the DNA evidence could be admitted as a business record,
and did not implicate the Confrontation Clause, so there was no requirement for live in-court
testimony), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (holding that the DNA evidence was testimonial, and was inadmissible absent live in-court testimony from the actual person who performed the test; a substitute witness would be insufficient to withstand a Confrontation
Clause violation).
133
938 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). Compare id. at 621 (holding that the
DNA reports, matching the defendant’s blood with the blood at the crime scene, which were
prepared by the Suffolk County Crime Laboratory, were testimonial), with Umpierre, 951
N.Y.S.2d at 385 (holding that the Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results, showing that the
defendant’s blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit, which were conducted by NYPD
Officer Stephen Rizzo, were testimonial). The Second Department decided Oliver seven
months before the Fourth Department decided Umpierre. Id.
134
Oliver, 938 N.Y.S.2d 619.
135
Id. at 621.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
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because it did not consist of “machine-generated graphs” and “raw
data,” as enunciated in Brown, but instead “consisted of information
which shed light on the guilt of the defendant and accused the defendant ‘by directly linking him . . . to the crime.’ ”139 The Second
Department rejected the analysis in Brown, reasoning that the admission of this evidence violated Crawford and the Confrontation Clause
because the source of this information did not testify at trial and was
not subject to cross-examination.140 Moreover, the court rejected the
prosecution’s contention that this evidence was properly admitted to
“complete the narrative.”141 The court emphasized that the trial
court’s error in admitting this evidence could not be deemed harmless
because it would compromise the defendant’s constitutional right to
confront his accusers.142
However, the New York Court of Appeals recently decided
People v. Pealer, holding that Breathalyzer calibration reports, offered to show the reliability of the Breathalyzer instrument, were
non-testimonial.143 In Pealer, police officers pulled over the defendant after observing him weaving in-and-out of lanes.144 Upon speaking with the defendant, the officers noticed that his eyes were red and
glassy and that his speech was slurred.145 After the defendant was arrested for failing the field sobriety tests and an initial breath screening, he took another Breathalyzer at the station, which revealed that
his blood-alcohol content was twice the legal limit.146
At trial, the prosecution offered two documents which stated
that the Breathalyzer instrument had been calibrated by the New
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services in Albany and a
third document which stated that the simulator solution sample was
approved for use in the Breathalyzer by the State Police.147 Despite
the defendant’s objection that his inability to cross-examine the author of each report violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause,
the court admitted the reports as a business record and the jury con139

Oliver, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22.
Id. at 622.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
985 N.E.2d at 904.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 904-05.
146
Id. at 905.
147
Id. (noting that these documents were introduced to show that the Breathalyzer at issue
was in proper working order at the time it was given to the defendant).
140
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victed the defendant.148 On appeal, the Fourth Department affirmed,
stating that the calibration reports were non-testimonial because they
were not accusatory, nor did they link the defendant to the charged
crime because they simply established the working order of the
Breathalyzer.149
On review, the New York Court of Appeals utilized its primary purpose test and acknowledged that “the records at issue bear
some resemblance to traditional testimonial hearsay because they
contain certified declarations of fact attesting that the breathalyzer
machine was functioning properly and its readings were accurate and
reliable.”150 However, this consideration alone, the court stated,
could not outweigh the remaining considerations.151 With regard to
classifying documents, the court relied on dicta from Melendez-Diaz,
observing that “[the Supreme Court] recognized the possibility that
records ‘prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance’—
precursors to an actual Breathalyzer test of a suspect—’may well
qualify as non-testimonial records.’ ”152 However, the Court of Appeals rejected the suggestion that “Melendez-Diaz pronounced a shift
in Confrontation Clause analysis that might call our precedent into
question.”153
V.

RECONCILING THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, regarding the
Constitution and federal law, are binding precedent on the lower
courts; however, the New York Court of Appeals has declined to follow the Supreme Court’s reasoning and has created conflict and inconsistencies among lower courts.154
Although the Court in Crawford declined to name what spe148

Pealer, 985 N.E.2d at 905.
Id.
150
Id. at 906-07.
151
Id. at 907.
152
Id.
153
Pealer, 985 N.E.2d at 907.
154
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
“[t]here is no room in our system for departing from this principle [that the Supreme Court’s
decisions are binding], for if it were otherwise, the law of the land would quickly lose its coherence.”); People v. Kin Kan, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that all courts
are bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution
and federal statutes).
149
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cific and particular types of evidence are testimonial, the Court established three categories in order to aid courts in making this determination.155 In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the Supreme Court
gave additional insight as to what evidence resembles “ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent,” what considerations are
important in making this determination, and under what circumstances this type of evidence is admissible without violating the Confrontation Clause.156 The Court established, in Melendez-Diaz, that the
affidavit, which revealed that the defendant possessed cocaine at the
time of his arrest, was testimonial, regardless of the fact that a neutral
laboratory conducted the testing.157
The Court’s decision in
Bullcoming bolstered the protection of the Confrontation Clause by
making it clear that the testimonial evidence could only be admissible
when the person who physically conducted the tests or certified the
documents could be cross-examined in court.158 By deeming the forensic laboratory affidavits at issue in Melendez-Diaz and the bloodalcohol test reports at issue in Bullcoming testimonial,159 the Supreme
Court added to the principles established in Crawford.160
When the New York Court of Appeals analyzed Rawlins, only
Crawford had been decided, which did not include any discussion
about scientific testing.161 Yet, the Court of Appeals, recognized that
latent fingerprint comparison reports under Crawford standards, in
which police officers identified a match between the defendant’s fingerprints and the fingerprints found at the crime scene, were “nothing
but testimonial.”162 However, even after Melendez-Diaz, the New
York Court of Appeals in Brown relied on its decision in Meekins, in
which the court held that rape-kit DNA reports were nontestimonial.163 The court dismissed the Supreme Court’s reasoning
155

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (noting that determination of constitutional admissibility
is almost always fact-specific as the inquiry is whether an out-of-court statement is a proper
substitute for accusatory in-court testimony).
156
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310; Bullcoming, 131 S Ct. 2705.
157
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306 (holding that the affidavit was testimonial because the
results either inculpated or exculpated the defendant, and an objective witness conducting
the tests would reasonably know that this type of report would be used in a criminal prosecution).
158
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2705.
159
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306; Bullcoming, 131 S Ct. at 2705.
160
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
161
Id.
162
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
163
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/17

18

Tuorto: You Blew It

2014]

YOU BLEW IT

1193

and placed great weight on the fact that a neutral party conducted the
DNA testing, which only revealed non-identifying “raw data.”164
However, the Court of Appeals failed to realize that the DNA data
report, which is a certified affidavit under both Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, supplies the reader with scientific test results, which shed
light on the defendant’s guilt.165 The OCME analyst who testified in
Brown had no personal knowledge of the tests that were performed
on both samples and could not testify to any errors that occurred during that process.166 The fact that she came to her own conclusion
about the defendant’s guilt should not dispose of the safeguards of
the Confrontation Clause in allowing the DNA reports into evidence.
The New York Court of Appeals’ interpretation of DNA evidence as
non-testimonial is inconsistent with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.167
Despite being decided before Bullcoming, both of the reports
in Thompson and Encarnacion should have been deemed testimonial
under the first and third categories set forth in Crawford.168 The job
of both the private lab technician in Thompson and the OCME analyst in Encarnacion was predicated on obtaining results which will be
used in aid of an investigation, which in many cases leads to a trial.169
The courts in Thompson and Encarnacion also rejected the Court’s
reasoning in Melendez-Diaz, which stressed the importance of being
able to use confrontation as a tool of reliability to protect against
fraudulent or incompetent forensic evidence.170 By determining that
the reports were non-testimonial and admitting them into evidence
without live in-court testimony, the courts in Thompson and
Encarnacion violated the very essence of what the Court in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming sought to protect—the reliability of the evidence and the defendant’s ability to confront the actual person who

164

Id. at 930-31.
Id. at 932.
166
Id. at 930.
167
Id. at 928.
168
Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 149; Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446. The first category is an affidavit that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, and the third category includes statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe
those statements would be used at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
169
Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
170
Id.; Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (rejecting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312,
319).
165

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 17

1194

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

performed the tests that shed light on his or her guilt.171
In DWI prosecutions specifically, New York courts should
follow the trend set in Oliver and Umpierre because the very nature
of sobriety tests, prepared by law enforcement and not a neutral
agency, are to prove that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was either above or below the legal limit, which will either convict or acquit the defendant.172 The only reason the court in Rawlins did not
find a Confrontation Clause violation was because there was already
such overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.173 The court in
Brown disregarded the Supreme Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz,
that scientific testing affidavits qualified as testimonial, by relying on
the court’s holding in Meekins that rape-kit DNA reports were nontestimonial.174 This not only created confusion on what qualifies as
testimonial evidence, but confusion on what precedent to follow.175
VI.

UMPIRING UMPIERRE

The issue before the court in Umpierre was whether the
Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 results were testimonial, and if so,
whether Officer Glatz could testify on behalf of Officer Rizzo.176
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, the court correctly determined that the Breathalyzer and
Intoxilyzer 5000 results were testimonial and that Officer Glatz could
not testify on behalf of Officer Rizzo. Assuming that the Fourth Department dismissed the federal precedent, like its counterparts that
followed the state precedent, it is likely that the Fourth Department
would still have held Breathalyzers to be testimonial requiring testimony from Officer Rizzo—exemplifying the importance of this decision for New York Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.

171

Compare Thompson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 149 and Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446, with
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312, 319, and Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2705. It is the author’s
opinion that Thompson and Encarnacion should be overruled because those interpretations
of what constitutes testimonial evidence and substitute witnesses are inconsistent with the
precedent set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
172
Compare Oliver, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22, with Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
173
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1026.
174
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930-31.
175
Id.
176
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 383.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/17

20

Tuorto: You Blew It

2014]

YOU BLEW IT
A.

1195

Breathalyzers as Testimonial Evidence

In a DWI prosecution, the admission of Breathalyzers as evidence is two-fold: (1) the evidence of the actual test results regarding
the blood-alcohol level, and (2) the certificates that confirm the
Breathalyzer’s function, calibration, and maintenance.177 Regardless
of whether the New York Court of Appeals in Pealer was correct in
holding that documents certifying the function of the equipment are
non-testimonial, and thus, admissible, it is evident that Crawford,
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, and even Brown, identify Breathalyzers as testimonial.178 Breathalyzer results, which are often conducted and prepared by law enforcement officials, will either inculpate or exculpate the defendant by showing that his blood-alcohol
level was either above or below the legal limit.179 In Umpierre, the
prosecution only sought to introduce the first type of Breathalyzer evidence because the prosecution suggested that the Breathalyzer and
Intoxilyzer 5000 were self-calibrating.180 If, under Pealer, the prosecution is allowed to submit the calibration certificates without implicating the Confrontation Clause and is also allowed to submit the actual Breathalyzer results without necessitating live in-court
testimony, the defendant would have no way to defend himself because he would not be able to cross-examine the documents.181 This
would result in a conviction virtually every time.182
B.

Substitute Witnesses and Law Enforcement
Involvement

After determining that the test results were testimonial, requiring live in-court testimony, the court in Umpierre considered
whether Officer Glatz could testify in place of Officer Rizzo to withstand a constitutional violation.
The court distinguished Umpierre from Brown because rather
177

Carriera, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 386; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (noting that if a
Breathalyzer had been given to help the defendant receive medical attention or to solve an
ongoing emergency, the results would likely have been deemed non-testimonial under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz but still not under Bullcoming); Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 930.
179
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
180
Id. at 384.
181
Id. at 385.
182
Id.
178
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than a subcontractor of the OCME, law enforcement officials prepared the Breathalyzer tests.183 The court in Umpierre observed that
the New York Court of Appeals relied heavily on the fact that the
scientific report in Brown arose from a source independent from law
enforcement.184 In Umpierre, the court stated, “everything presented
shows substantial law enforcement involvement,” and thus, “by necessity invokes a confrontational situation even under the Brown rationale.”185 While in Brown, the identity of the suspect was unknown
and the testing did not connect the defendant to the crime until years
later, Umpierre’s identity and guilt were known immediately following the testing.186 This is more testimonial in nature than a forensic
analyst’s test on a DNA sample to determine the identity of the perpetrator because there is a greater risk that law enforcement officials
will conduct procedures with a bias or motive to gain incriminating
evidence.
After determining that the Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000
results were testimonial, the Court properly concluded that Officer
Glatz could not testify on Officer Rizzo’s behalf. The Court in
Bullcoming made it clear that the only way to prevent a Confrontation Clause violation is to have the person who conducted the tests
testify.187 Officer Glatz, although a trained officer who knew of Officer Rizzo’s training with respect to Breathalyzers, did not have personal knowledge of the encounter, and he would not be able to answer questions about the Breathalyzer equipment and test, including
any possible human error.188
VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved over time.189 The Court has effectuated a
shift in determining whether there is a violation of a defendant’s right
to confrontation, focusing more on the testimonial nature of the evidence, rather than its reliability.190 While the Supreme Court has ex183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 386.
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
Id.
Id.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714.
Id. at 2714-15.
Weisgerber, supra note 25, at 614.
Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d at 4.
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panded the meaning of testimonial, the New York Court of Appeals’
failure to follow the Supreme Court’s reasoning has caused confusion
among its lower courts.191
Despite this, the court’s decision in Umpierre follows the
precedent set forth by the Supreme Court in Crawford, MelendezDiaz and Bullcoming.192 Even if the court in Umpierre used the test
annunciated in Brown, it still would have determined that both the
Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer results were testimonial, requiring incourt testimony from Officer Rizzo because the prosecution’s case
relied solely on the NYPD’s Breathalyzer and Intoxilyzer 5000 test
results, which revealed the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was
above the legal limit.193 Because the test results’ sole purpose was to
connect the defendant to the crime, in order to withstand a constitutional violation, the live in-court testimony of the enforcement official who conducted the tests, Officer Rizzo, was required.194
Although the courts in New York, even after Crawford,
Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming have narrowly interpreted what constitutes testimonial evidence, it is evident that Breathalyzer results
are, by their very nature, testimonial. Therefore, the court in
Umpierre correctly reasoned and concluded that the admission of the
test results violated the Confrontation Clause. The decision in
Umpierre is very significant for New York Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because it will, like the seminal trio of federal cases, effectuate a shift within the lower courts, as the court properly observed
that the involvement of law enforcement in collecting and presenting
evidence lends itself to a court’s finding that the evidence is testimonial in nature.

191

Compare Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (holding that an autopsy report could be admitted
as a business record, not requiring live in-court testimony, because an autopsy report is nontestimonial), with Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (holding that an unredacted autopsy report could be
admitted into evidence without testimony from the person who prepared it because it was not
testimonial).
192
Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d 382.
193
Id. at 386.
194
Id.
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